Volume 34

Issue 4

Article 2

June 1928

A Royal Prerogative in the United States
Judson A. Crane
University of Pittsburgh

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, European History Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Judson A. Crane, A Royal Prerogative in the United States, 34 W. Va. L. Rev. (1928).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol34/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Crane: A Royal Prerogative in the United States

WEST VIRGINIA

LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUME XXXIV

JUNE, 1928

NUMBER 4

A ROYAL PREROGATIVE IN THE UNITED STATES
JUDSON A. CRANE*
Blackstone divides the King's Prerogatives into two
classes, the direct and incidental.' The incidental are said
to be only "exception in favor of the Crown of those general rules that are established for the rest of the community; such as, that no costs shall be recovered against the
King; that the King can never be a joint tenant; that his
debt shall be preferred before a debt to any of his subThese incidental prerogatives were elaborated
jects."
during the medieval period when the King was the head
and representative of the State, the fountain of justice, but
2
as a superior feudal lord with special privileges. It is proposed to examine the last of these prerogatives, expressed
by Lord Coke in the form of a maxim, "Quando jus dortini
Regis et subditi insimuZ concurrunt jus Regis praeferri debet."' 3 It is difficult to find any critical account of it in the
earlier books, perhaps because as Blackstone tells us such a
matter until a late period was protected from discussion by
a taboo. "It was ranked among the arcana imperii: and like
the mysteries of the bona dea was not suffered to be pried
into by any but such as were initiated in its service: because
perhaps the exertion of the one, like the solemnities of the
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh, Pa.
2
5

1 BL. CoM. 240.
3 HOLDSWORTH, HIST. OF ENO. LAW 351.
Quick's Case, 9 Rep. 129a (1575).
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other would not bear the inspection of a rational and sober
'4
enquiry."
While modern justification for this prerogative of priority may be found in the maxim "Thesaurus Regis est vinculum
pacis et bellorum nervus,"5 its historic origin was not based
on any such social utilitarian consideration. Historically it
seems to be an incident to the facts that under the early
feudal system the King was in theory the source of all land
titles, as well as the fountain of justice, and through his
fiscal officers and courts he collected the services due him
as charges on the property held under him in feudal tenure.
After the Norman Conquest it was the accepted legal
theory in England, as on the continent, that lands were
held of the King as ultimate feudal lord. 6 An exception to
the continental system of considerable importance in the
development of a strong centralized government was that
military services were owing not to the mesne lord but
directly to the King.7 As the remedy of the feudal lord
generally was by means of distress and ultimate forfeiture
of land and chattels thereon when the tenant was in default of his obligations, 8 so the Crown as overlord could
seize the res on non performance of the obligations that attended its possession. The Exchequer was originally a
part of the Curia Regia, 9 and as the lord could distrain his
tenant in his own court, 10 so could the King in his."
Rights of action and remedies in personal actions for
debts between subjects were slow and gradual in their
growth 12 as compared with the Crown remedies. Magna
Charta VIII provided, "We or our bailiffs shall not seize
any land or rent for any debt, as long as the present goods
or chattels of the debtor do suffice to pay the debt, and the
debtor himself be ready to satisfy therefor * * * the pledges
4 1 BL. Com. 237.
GOD.
293.
0 2 BL. CoN. 50; DIGBY, HIsT. OF LAW OF REAL PROp. 34; 1 REEMS, ENO. LAW go;
ALLEN, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 125; 1 P. & M. MIST. OF ENO. LAW 232.
DIGY 36.
8 2 P. & M. 352; 3 HOLDSWORTH 12.
, I HoLDswoRTH 29, 100.

3o 2 P. & M. 353.

Limitations to the exercise of distraint, which bad evidently been

abused, are set forth in Magna Charta X; STAT. WEST. I, XVI; STAT. MARLUBnsEo, 52
Hen. 3.
11 See P. & M. 311 as to reliefs in cases of death of tenant in chief of the King.
The King had a remedy against his debtor's debtor. This was taken advantage of
by a sort of subrogation by the Crown debto
to the Crown's right of garnishment,
under the writ of Quo Minus. See 3 BL. Comr. APP. 3, §4; 1 HOLDSWORTH 105. Thia
developed into the Extent in Aid, commented on in Atty. Gen]. v. Poultney, Hardie 40%
Extents in Aid were abolished in 1817, 57 Geo. 3, c. 117.
= 2 P. & M. 121.
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shall answer for the debt; and if they will, they shall have
the lands and rents of the debtor, until they be satisfied of
that which they have paid for him * * * -*"13 This is in terms
a limitation of powers, and presupposes the right of the
Crown as creditor to seize real or personal property of the
Crown debtor. It concedes that personal property will be
taken rather than lands if sufficient. Further, sureties are
subrogated just as in the most recent cases in our own
courts 14 to the extraordinary remedies of the Crown.
A priority of the Crown in distribution of decedents'
estates is affirmed in Magna Charta XVIII. "If any that
holdeth of us law fee do die and our sheriff do shew our
letters patent of our debt which the dead man did owe to
us, it shall be lawful to our sheriff or bailiff to attach and
enroll all the goods and chattels of the dead being found
in said fee, to the value of the same debt, * * * so that nothing thereof shall be taken away until we shall be clearly
paid off the debt; and the residue shall remain to the executors, to perform the testament of the dead: * * * * saving to his wife and children their reasonable part." This is
the first statutory statement of a Crown priority, and a
concession that wills may be executed, saving a family allowance.
The early remedy of the subject as against his debtor's
property was by distress, and limitations on its exercise by
feudal lords are referred to in note 10, supra. Bracton set forth
an elaborate "restatement" of the law of civil procedure,
including distress' 5 This was originally, like modern attachment, a means of securing appearance of the defendant at court. 16 It is suggested by Reeves1 7 that the judgment was collected out of the goods distrained, and this
finds some support in early cases.' 8 So long as personal
actions for breach of contracts were rare inadequate remedies were not a great hardship. But with the beginnings of
trade better remedies were demanded.
Under Edward I legislation began to provide remedies
See 1 REEVES, HIST. OF ENO. LAW 243; 3 BL. Com. 419.
269 U. S. 483, 70 L.. ed. 368, 46 S. Ct. 176
(1925) ; Re Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912) ; Woodward V.
Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689 (1922) ; see also n. 4, supra.
'a BRACTON 439 ff.; 1 REEVES 480 ff.
15 1 REEVES 480 ff.
47 2 REEVES 187 n. (e).
"' SELD. SOC. SEL. CIV. PLEAS, Vol. 1, 102, 184.
33

11 Bramwell v. U. S. Fid. *& G. Co.,
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for the enforcement of consensual personal obligations. By
the Statute of Merchants 0 a merchant creditor could secure
a recognizance before the Mayor of London or the chief
warden of some other city, and if the debt was not paid
sell the land in the burrage, and if that was not enough all
the chattels and lands of the debtor were turned over to
the creditor until the debt was paid. Similar provisions
20
were made for debts acknowledged in the Staple Court.
As to creditors generally a provision was made in the
Statute of Westminster H21 whereby on debts recovered or
acknowledged in the King's Court the creditor could in his
election have fieri facias of lands and goods, or have delivered to him all the chattels of the debtor saving his oxen
and beasts of the plough, and one half of his land at a
,'asonable price or extent. This was the origin of the
Elegit.22 It is to be noted that it was limited to half the
land, the other half being saved to secure performance of
feudal services. 23 This is the first statutory mention of
fieri facias, and in the opinion of Reeves 24 its origin.
The subject had thus been vested with part of the remedies available to the Crown from before Magna Charta.
The continuing superiority of the Crown remedy and its
greater antiquity would seem to imply as a natural incident its priority, especially as there developed the notion
expressed in the maxim "Nullus tempus occurit Regi."
Where the Crown and the subject could both have seized
property of a debtor the tardiness of the Crown in getting

19

13 Edw. 1, 3. 3 HOLOSWORTH 113; Jenks Edw. I; 1 SEL. ESSAYS 142. The right
to take over half the lands of the debtor as tenant in Elegit under the STAT. WESTmINSTEs; II, and the rights created by the Statutes of Merchants and Statutes Staple,
seem to be of adaptations to the use of merchants and other creditors of the special
rights in the nature of a gage or mortgage recognized in the Jewish Exchequer, as
the practice of the early mercantile class, the English Jews. See SELD. Soc. SEL. PLEAS OF
THE JEWISH EXCHEQUER, xiii, 100; 1 P. & M. 475; HAZELTNE. GAGE OF LAND, 8 SEL.
ESSAYS 46, 17 HARV. L. REV. 549. 18 ibid. 36.
0 27 Edw. III, St. 2, c. 9. By 33 Hen. VIII c. 29, obligations to the King became
of the same force and effect as a Statute Sfaple. Extent by this time was the common remedy for the collection of Crown debts. The Statute of Henry VIII has been
said to be merely declaratory of the remedies of the Crown. 3 COKE 12b; 3 Com. Die.
393; 2 COKE INST. 19. The power to sell land taken on Extent by the Crown, and not
merely hold it, was granted in 1785 by the Crown Debtor's Act, 25 Geo. M c. 86. Sea
also Crown Suits Act 1865, 28 and 29 Vic. c. 104, §50.
. 13 Edw. I, XV1I.
22 DiGBy,
isT. OF LAW OF REAL PROP. 282; 2 BL. Co. 161; COKE Lr. 289b.
23 3 BL. Cor. 419. Power to reach the whole, instead of the half by Elegit was
granted by the Judgments Act 1838, 1 & 2 Vic. c. 110, §12. Power to sell the land was
granted the judgment creditor in 1864, Judgments Act 27 & 28 Vic. c. 112, 4. In the
American Colonies the whole of the debtor's land could be aken and sold under an act
applicable to the Colonies, 5 Geo. II, c. 7 (1712). See Jones v. Jones, 1 Bland. Ch.
As to extent in the United States see FREEMAN,
Md. 448, 217 Am. Dec. 327 (1827).
EXECUTIONS, 370, 372 ff.
187 n. (c). But see Jenks, Edward I, 1 SEL. ESSAYS 142.
21 2'REEv
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25
into action does not operate to its prejudice.
The priority of the Crown was a well settled rule of the

common law before the Revolution. 26 The majority of our

states have accepted it as a common law attribute of state
sovereignty.2 7 In a few states it has been rejected.28 Nowhere is it denied that the prerogative existed as part of
English common law. Its adoption here has been approved
or disapproved in the light of its supposed underlying reasons or justification as a modern institution and its conformity to a republican form of government. Justice Story in
United Stateg v. State Bank,29 justified it in language often

quoted, "It is founded not so much upon any personal advantage to the sovereign as upon motives of public policy, in

order to secure an adequate revenue to sustain the public burdens and discharge the public debts."

Bourquin, Dis. J. in

American Bonding Company v. Reynolds,30 adopting Blackstone's classification of direct and incidental prerogatives said,

"The crown's priority over subjects in payment of debts is to
secure and conserve the revenues-the life blood of the
state, that the latter may be maintained in peace and war
and its obligations discharged. It is of the incidental prerogatives and belongs to the King, not as an individual, but
parens patriae, or as a universal trustee for the people. It is
-s 7 Com. Diu. 90; HARDIE 35; Buchanan, "Some Aspects of the Royal Prerogative,"
35 Juni. REv. 49. The King was supposed to be so engrossed in the affairs of state as
to be able to take care of every private matter relating to his revenues. GiLB. HzSTony
OF 'Hri EXCHEQUEIR 110; In re Henley & Co., 9 Ch. Div. 469, 48 4. J. Ch. N. S. 147.
The priorities of the Crown were set forth in statutory form in 33 Henry VIII, 39.
23 Quick's Case, 9 Coke 129b; Coke's Case, GODs. 289; R. u. Curtis, 1 Ves. Sr. 483;
Stringfellov's Case, 3 East 6; Giles v. Grover, 1 Cl. & F. 72, 9 Bing. 128; 1 CoRE Lrr.
131b; BACON'S ABR. 91; GILD. EXCH. 91; 3 Com. DIG. 397; 7 ibid. 90; 2 TIDD'S PRAC.
1052.
12 American Bonding Co. v. Reynolds, 203 Fed. 356 (1913)
; Marshall v. N. Y.,
254 U. S. 380, 65 L. ed. 315, 41 S. Ct. 447 (1920) ; U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. MoFarson.
78 CoL 338, 241 Pac 728 (1925) ; Robinson v. Bank of Darien, 18 Ga. 65 (1855) ; Booth
477 (1854) ; Re
v. State, 131 Ga. 760, 63 S. E. 602 (1908) ; Dennis -v.Maynard, 15 Ill.
Marathon! Say. Bank, 191 Ia. 696, 196 N. W. 729, 200 N. W. 199 (1924); State v.
18
Am. Dec. 327
Bland.
Ch.
Jones,
1
Jones
v.
(1786);
Rogers, 2 Harr. & McH. 198
(1827) ; Aetna Accident & Liab. Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, 170 Pac. 760 (1918) ; Be
Holland Baking Co., 313 Mo. 307, 281 S. W. 702 (1926) ; Re Carnegie Trust Co., 206
N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912) ; U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Ore. 261,
217' Pac. 332 (1923) ; Com. v. Lewis, 6 Binn 266 (1814) ; Booth & Flinn Ltd. v. Miller,
237 Pa. 297, 85 At. 457 (1912) ; Nat]. Surety Co. v. Pixton, 60 Utah 289, 208 Pac. 878
(1922) ; Md. Casualty Co. v. McConnell, 148 Tenn. 656, 257 S. W. 410 (1924) ; Woodward
V. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689 (1922). In these cases the English rule is recognized and its existence as part of the common law of the states is assumed. In some
of them special reasons were found to exist which prevented its application.
23 Md. Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 173 Ark. 103, 291 S. W. 1003 (1927); Coin. of
Banking v. Chelsea Sav. Bank, 161 Mich. 691, 125 N. W. 424 (1910) ; Potter v. Fidelity
& D. Co., 101 Miss. 823, 51 So. 713 (1911) ; Board of Freeholders of Middlesex Co. v.
State Bank of New Brunswick, 29 N. J. Eq. 268, 30 N. J. Eq. 311 (1828); No. Car.
State v.
Corp. Com. v. Citizens Bank T. Co., 193 N. C. 613, 137 S. E. 587 (1927)
Harris, 2 Bal. L. (S. C.) 598 (1832). In many of these cases reasons existed for not
applying the rule even had it been accepted. In many of the states where the rule does
not exist at common law the state is given certain priorities by legislation.
: 6 Pet. 29, 8 L. ed. 308'(1832).
m n. 27.
2 Sawa,
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in fact a reservation or exception to the general course of
law in favor of the public and for its good." Sanner, J., in
Aetna Company v. Miller,31 said that at the time of the organization of the Territory of Montana "there existed a vast
number of decided cases from almost all the states, holding that divers and sundry prerogatives ascribed to the
King at common law had passed to the states; those only
being denied which attached to the King in his personal
character rather than as parens patriae, or personification
of the sovereign," and then shows that by the great weight
of authority this prerogative of priority had been adopted.
Haight, J., in in re CarnegieTrut Company,3 2 referring to the
New York constitution adopting the common law saving
the King's prerogatives repugnant to the constitution, said
that "his sovereignty, powers, functions and duties, in so
far as they pertain to civil government, now devolve upon
the people of the state, and consequently are not in conflict with any of the provisions of the constitution * * * such
preference became a part of the common law of our state,
and is so continued under our present constitution." Buchanan, C. J. in State v. Bank of Maryland,3 answered the objectors as follows, "This asserted priority has been denounced as an odious prerogative, springing up in the' barbarous and tyrannical ages of the British government and
inconsistent with the genius of our people and the spirit of
our institutions * * * *. The government of the state is
established for the good of the whole, and can only be supported by means of its revenue; which revenue the good of
the whole requires to be protected. And as it can only act
by its agents, who, no matter how vigilant, cannot always
be present to protect its rights, a priority in the payment of
its debts (which must always be of a public nature) is
necessary to enable it to accomplish the ends of its institution."
Courts which have denied the prerogative have relied on
the fact that the Federal Government has no such right at
common law,8 4 that its non-existence is to be presumed
from failure to claim it during long periods of state exist32

Ibid.

6 Gill & J. 205, 26 Am. Dec. 561 (1834).
Middlesex Co. v. State Bank, eupra, n. 28; State v. Harris, ibid. See also Brown
v. Am. Bonding Co., 210 Fed. 844 (1914).
31
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ence, 35 and in a few cases it is discussed on its merits and

condemned as being of such a monarchial nature as to be
inconsistent with our institutions.3 6

It has been assumed that the Federal Government has no
common law prerogative of priority.3 7 One explanation
given is that there is no Federal Common Law.38 The United
States certainly has one common law prerogative of sovereignty, that of immunity from suit, save by its consent. 39
The need of a common law priority has not been seriously
felt because of the ground having been substantially covered by several statutes adopted between 1789 and 1799.40
The principal statute has continued in about the same form
from the beginning and provides for a priority for the
United States debts as against insolvent decedents' estates
and in cases of voluntary assignments and of attachment by
legal process of estates of absconding or absent debtors. In
asserting a priority in cases of voluntary assignments the
statute goes beyond the common law prerogative as will be
shown later. The constitutionality of the Federal legislation might seem doubtful if no common law prerogative
exist, and in the absence of express powers in the Constitution. It might be conceded as necessary and proper in its
application to taxes and obligations of government officials.
But the statutes have recently been applied to ordinary
contract claims, as for the price of munitions sold in the
market. 41 The legislation was sustained at a time when the
judiciary was of the Federalist turn of mind, in one case on
the general welfare clause, 42 and in another, the opinion
43
being by Marshall,, on the necessary and proper clause.
The priority provided in voluntary assignments has been
claimed in cases of receiverships where the defendant corporations have consented to the proceedings. The Supreme
Court has recently held this to be in effect a voluntary as" Middlesex Co. v. State Bank, supra, n. 28; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rainwater,
ibid; No. Car. Corp. Com. v. Citizens B. & T. Co., ibid.
State v. Harris, supra, n. 28; Com'r. of Banking v. Chelsea Say. Bank, ibid.
a' See U. S. v. State Bank of No. Car., 6 Pet. 29, 8 L. ed. 308 (1832) ; Price V.
U. S., 269 U. S. 492, 70 L. ed. 373 (1926).
" Equitable Trust Co. -. Connecticut Brass & Mfg. Corp., 290 Fed. 712 (1923).
so U. S. v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171, 1 S. Ct. 240 (1882) ; U. S. v. Clarke,
8 Pet. 436, 8 L. ed. 1001 (1834)
10 See discussion of these statutes in the cases cited in n. 37, supra.
43 Equitable Trust Co. v. Conn. Brass & Mfg. Co., supra, n. 38; and advances of
money under War Credits Board to aid in manufacture of munitions, U. S. v. Butterworth Judson Corp., 269 U. S. 604. 70 L. ed. 380 (1925).
42 U. S. v. Clason, 2 Brev. 118 (1806).
is U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 2 L. ed. 304 (1804). See 3 BEvgnc
Ln ow

MAnsHALL 163.
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signment within the act establishing a priority for the
United States. 44 Should a corporation or other debtor go
into bankruptcy priorities are governed by the Bankruptcy
Act. Section 64 of the Act of 1898 has been interpreted as
allowing no priority to the United States except for taxes,
these being the only claims expressly enumerated. 45 By a
recent amendment to this section the United States has been
defined as a person, so as to be within the clause allowing
priority to 'debts owing to any person who by the laws of
the states or of the United States is entitled to priority. '4
This probably incorporates into the Bankruptcy Act the old
statutes under which the United States may claim priority
for all debts.
Where the common law right to priority exists it is subject to certain limitations, the principal of which is that it
is lost once the property against which it is claimed ceases
to belong to the debtor.47 A voluntary assignment passes
the title from the debtor to a third person, and thereafter,
the common law priority of the state is gone. 48

But a re-

ceivership which does not pass the debtor's title does not
49
affect the priority.
A frequent occasion for assertion of priority in recent
years has been the failure of a bank in which public funds
are deposited. The deposit is usually protected by a surety
bond. The surety having paid the state, it seeks to be subrogated to the alleged priority of the depositor, and has in
4 Price v. U. S., supra, n. 87; U. S. v. Butterworth Judson Corp., supra, n. 40.
See Blair, "Priority of the United States in Receiverships," 39 HAnv. L. REv. 1.
(1925). This was
" Davis v. Pringle, 268 U. S. 816, 69 L. ed. 974, 46 S. Ct. 549
based on Guar. Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & S. Co.. 224 U. S. 166, 32 S. Ct. 457,
66 L. ed. 706 (1911) ; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emer. Fleet Corp.,
Taxes are entitled to priority in
258 U. S. 549, 66 L. ed. 762, 42 S. Ct. 886 (1921)
receivership proceedings, being debts. Price v. U. S., supra, n. 87. Rogers, J., had
attempted to sustain priority for taxes under a common law prerogative, the existence
of which he had denied in Equitable Trust Co. a. Conn. Brass & Mfg. Co., supra, n. 38.
His decision was affirmed in Stripe v. U. S., 269 U. S. 603, 70 L. ed. 879. 46 S. Ct.
182 (1926), on the ground that a tax is a debt. The opinion below is to be found in
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson Shipyards Corp., 6 F. (2d) 752 (1925).
May 26, 1926, c. 406, 15, 44 STATS. 666.
'
Giles v. Grover, 1 Clark & Finnelly 72 (1832) ; 2 TwD PSAc, 1053; 8 Paxcn 0.
4 State v. Bank of Md., 6 Gill. & J. 205, 26 Am. Dec. 561 (1834) ; State V. Williams,
But
101 Md. 529, 61 AtI. 297 (1905) ; State v. Foster, 6 Wyo. 199, 88 Pac. 926 (1896).
see Aetna Accident & Liability Co. v. Miller, supra, n. 27. Also it has been held that
the priority is lost when a bank is being liquidated under statutory proccs by a state
officer. Natl. Surety Co. v. Pixton, 60 Utah 289, 208 Pac. 878 (1922); Aetna Casualty
& S. Co. v. Moore, 107 Wash. -99, 181 Pac. 40 (1919) ; No. Car. Corp. Coin. v. Cit'.
B. & T. Co., 193 N. C. 513, 137 S. E. 587 (1927) ; Comr. of Banking v. Chelsea Say.
Bank, 161 Mich. 691, 125 N. W. 424 (1910). See also Middlesex Co. v. State Bank,
supra, n. 28. Cf. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bramwell, supra, n. 27; Md. Casualty Cca
v. McConnell, supra, n. 27. As to waiver by implication under statutory rules of distribution see Comm. v. Comr. of Banks, 240 Mass. 244, 183 N. E. 625 (1921). As to para-.
mount rights of United States, see Bramwill a. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U. S. 488,
70 L. ed. 368 (1926).
'1 Marshall v. N. Y., 8upra, n. 27.
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0
In some
several instances been accorded this privilege.
states it is denied on the ground that the state can waive its
common law right of priority, and has impliedly done so by
the requirements in the depositary laws for adequate suret# protection of deposits. 51 In other states it is held that
contracting for additional protection of public deposits,
even under statutory requirements, does not by implication
waive or repeal a common law right of the state, which
right passes to the surety by subrogation under general
principles of suretyship. 52 The prerogative of priority is
so far an attribute of sovereignty that it cannot be divided
nor delegated to a county or other inferior municipal corporation.53 It has been urged that it should not enure to the
benefit of a surety, particularly a paid surety company,
54
when not needed in the interest of the public treasury.
The priority of the state seems to be in accord with the
public interest and should be preserved so far as necessary
for the public interest. There is considerable diversity
among the states as to its standing at the present time in the
light of statutes, such as the depositary acts, and as to the
rights of sureties. The question is so far a matter of general commercial interest, particularly to the surety companies doing a nation wide business, as to be a suitable subject
for an attempt to formulate a Uniform State Law.
" So. Phila. St. Bank v. Natl. Surety Co., 8 D. C. 93 (1926, semble) reviewed on
other grounds and priority not mentioned. 288 Pa. 300, 135 At!. 748 (1927) ; Woodward v. Sayre, supr n. 27; Be Carnegie Trust Co., ibid; Aetna Accident & Liability
Co. v. Miller, ibid. As to subrogation to statutory priority of United States, see
Shaeffer's Est., 281 Pa. 138, 126 AtL 205 (1924).
maRe Central Bank, 23 Ariz. 574, 205 Pac. 915 (1922) ; U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
McFerson, 78 Col. 338, 241 Pac. 728 (1925) ; In -re Holland Banking Co., 313 Mo. 307,
281 S. W. 702 (1926) ; Nat. Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134, 241 Pac. 1063 (1925)
Nat'l Surety Co. v. Pixton, supra, n. 27.
52 Booth v. State, 131 Ga. 750, 63 So. 502 (1908) ; Amer. Surety Co. V. Pearson,
146 Minn. 342, 178 N. W. 817 (1920) ; Lenoir v. Winn., 4 S. C. Eq. 65, 6 Am. Dec.
597 (1809) ; Fid. & Dept. Co. at-Md. v. State Bank of Portland, 117 Ore. 1, 242 Pac.
823 (1926) ; Md. Casualty Co. v. McConnell, 146 Tenn. 656, 257 S. W. 410 (1924) ; Woodward v. Sayre, supra, n. 27.
'3 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bramwell, 12 F. (2d) 307 (1926) ; Glynn Co. v.
Brunswick Terminal Co., 101 Ga. 244, 28 S. E. 604 (1897); Bignell v. Cummins, 69
Mont. 294, 222 Pac. 797 (1923) ; Re Northern Bank, 212 N. Y. 607, 10 N. E. 749
(1914) ; U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Rainer, 120 Tenn. 357, 113 S. W. 397 (1907) ; Calhoun
County v. Connell, 99 W. Va. 483, 129 S. E. 399 (1925). But see Denver v. Stenger. 295
Fed. 809 (1924).
" U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McFerson, 78 Col. 328, 241 Pac. 728 (1925). See also
Nat]. Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134, 241 Pac. 1063 (1925).
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